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The Remedies for Constitutional Flaws Have Major Flaws
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1
Preamble
In this essay, Professor Pierce describes the many ways in which the conservative majority
of the Supreme Court has attempted to use its unique approach to interpretation of the constitution
to restructure the government and to reallocate power among the branches of government. He then
describes the problems that the Court has encountered in its efforts to choose remedies for the
constitutional flaws that it detects.
Increasingly, the Court must choose between remedies that are ineffective and remedies
that make it impossible for the government to function. Pierce predicts that the problems that the
Court has experienced to date will increase and will become even more intractable if it continues
to apply its present approach to interpretation of the constitution.
Pierce argues that the choice of remedy problems will diminish significantly if the Court
adopts an approach to interpretation of the constitution that is less rigid. The Court should accord
Congress the deference it deserves in recognition of the challenges that it faces in its efforts to
create a government that is true to our constitutional values and that is capable of performing the
critical functions of government.

Introduction
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued many opinions in which it has detected
constitutional flaws in the structure of government and the allocation of power among units of
government. The cases invariably divide the Justices between the conservatives who see a wide
variety of constitutional flaws in the structure and power of the administrative state and the liberals
who see no such flaws. The conservative majority has made it clear that it is prepared to reach out
to detect and to remedy every conceivable constitutional flaw. It has created special highly
permissive versions of the doctrines of standing, ripeness, finality, and exhaustion that allow it to
address the flaws that it perceives in circumstances in which it does not permit any other type of
challenge to an agency action.2
In one of its earliest steps in this quixotic quest, the majority held that the vesting and take
care clauses of article II prohibit Congress from creating two or more layers of insulation between
the president and any inferior officer of the United States. In its 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise
Fund v. PCAOB, 3 the Court held that Congress cannot limit the power of the president to remove
an officer to circumstances in which the president states a cause for removal and also limit the
power of the officer to remove an inferior officer to circumstances in which the officer states a
cause for removal.4 To reach and address that issue in, however, the majority had to make up a
non-existent provision of a statute.
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The Sarbannes Oxley Act created a new agency called the Public Company Accounting
and Oversight Board (PCAOB) to regulate the practices of corporate accountants. The members
of the PCAOB can be removed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only for cause.
The majority concluded that the members of the SEC are officers, the members of the PCAOB are
inferior officers, and the “for cause” limit on the power of the SEC to remove the members of the
PCAOB, when combined with the “for cause” limit on the president’s power to remove the
members of the SEC, violates the vesting and take care clauses of article II.5 The Court remedied
that structural flaw by holding unconstitutional the statutory “for cause” limit on the SEC’s power
to remove members of the PCAOB.6
There is no statutory “for cause” limit on the power of the SEC to remove members of the
SEC7, however, so there was only one layer of insulation between the president and the members
of the PCAOB. It follows that the “for cause” limit on the power of the SEC to remove members
of the PCAOB was entirely consistent with the new rule of constitutional law that the majority
announced. The majority explained the difference between the facts that were the basis for its
decision and the actual facts of the case by referring to the litigating positions of the parties. Since
the parties had litigated the case on the assumption that there was a statutory limit on the
president’s power to remove a member of the SEC, the majority accepted that assumption for
purposes of deciding the case.8
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer quoted the framers of the constitution and prior
opinions of the Court to support his argument that the overriding purpose of the constitution was
to create a workable government.9 He argued that the necessary and proper clause in article I
confers on Congress discretion to create a wide variety of agency structures.10 He predicted that
the rigid formalistic structure of government that the majority was trying to create through
interpretation of the ambiguous language of the vesting clause and the take care clause would make
it impossible for the complicated structure of government that Congress created to function.11 In a
lengthy appendix, Justice Breyer identified tens of thousands of inferior officer positions that
would be unconstitutional if the Court were to apply the new principle of constitutional law it
announced across the government.12
Thirteen years later, Justice Breyer’s prediction seems prescient. Many of the Court’s
attempts to identify a remedy for a perceived constitutional flaw have forced the Court to choose
between creating conditions in which government cannot function and implementing a remedy
that is ineffective. The problems that the Court is experiencing in its efforts to choose appropriate
remedies for constitutional flaws in agency structures and powers are a product of a combination
of four lines of opinions that illustrate the ways in which the Court has limited the structure of
government and the allocation of power among units of government, combined with the practical
limits of our political system.
In part I, I describe the four lines of cases in which the Court has used its interpretations of the
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constitution to determine the permissible structure of government and the permissible allocation
of power among units of government. In part II, I describe the cases that illustrate the problems
that the Court is experiencing in the process of choosing remedies for the constitutional flaws that
the Court detects. In part III, I predict that the Court will experience even more serious problems
in its efforts to choose remedies for constitutional flaws if it continues to adhere to its current
methods of identifying constitutional flaws. In part IV, I suggest ways in which the Court can
change its methods of identifying constitutional flaws that will allow the politically accountable
branches of government the flexibility needed to create a government that can function in ways
that are consistent with the constitution.

I. The four lines of cases that limit the structures and powers of
government
The Court has issued four lines of opinions that apply provisions of the constitution to limit
the permissible structure of government and the permissible allocation of power among units of
government. They are: (1) opinions in which the Court has interpreted the due process clause to
require a degree of insulation between the administrative law judges (ALJs) who make
adjudicative decisions in agencies and the political appointees who head the agencies where they
preside to minimize the risk that the ALJs will behave in a manner that reflects systemic bias in
favor of the views of the agency head; (2) opinions in which the Court has limited the power of
Congress to delegate power to agencies by interpreting and enforcing the clause in article I that
vests the legislative power in Congress; (3) opinions in which the Court has limited the power of
Congress to confer the power to appoint agency officials by interpreting and applying the
appointments clause in article II; and (4) opinions in which the Court has limited the circumstances
in which Congress can limit the president’s removal power by interpreting and enforcing the
vesting clause and the take care clause in article II.
A. Due Process Cases
The Court has long held that due process applies to the many agency adjudications in which
an agency may deprive an individual of liberty or property.13 The Court has long held that due
process includes the right to a neutral decisionmaker.14 During the 1930s, there were many
complaints that the agency hearing examiners, who are now called administrative law judges
(ALJs), were systematically biased in favor of the agencies where they presided.15 Studies
supported those complaints.16 After over a decade of debate, Congress responded to those
complaints and studies by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).17
The APA responded to the complaints and findings of bias in several ways. First, it created
a structural framework in which the agency personnel who investigate alleged wrongdoing or play
a role in initiating an enforcement proceeding or in representing the government in such a
proceeding can play no role in supervising an ALJ.18 The investigative and enforcement personnel
13
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are also prohibited from communicating with an ALJ off the record.19 Second, to protect ALJs
from the risk that agency officials might try to influence them to make rulings that favor the agency
and disadvantage the private party, the APA prohibits the agency from playing any role in
determining the salary of an ALJ20 and requires the agency to assign cases to ALJs on a rotation
basis.21 Finally, the most important safeguard of the decisional independence of ALJs is the APA’s
limit on the power of an agency to remove or otherwise discipline an ALJ by requiring the agency
to state a cause for the action.22
Congress recognized that agency heads nominated by the president and confirmed by the
Senate had to be able to determine the policy content of the decisions that agencies make in
adjudications. It insured that presidentially appointed agency heads had complete control over the
policies that were reflected in the decisions the agency made in adjudications by conferring on the
agency head the power to substitute a final decision of the agency itself for the initial decision of
the ALJ.23
In 1950, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in which it praised the APA and strongly
suggested that the statutory limit on the removal power in the APA was required by due process.24
The Court backed away from that suggestion in a later case,25 but it has continued to recognize the
importance of a neutral decision maker in its opinions that interpret and apply the due process
clause.26 Thus, for instance, in 1975, the Court upheld as consistent with due process a state agency
administrative adjudication procedure that was structured the way that the APA structures federal
agency adjudications.27 In dicta, the Court described and praised the APA’s method of
simultaneously assuring that the person who presides in an agency adjudication is not biased in
favor of the agency and that the policy content of the decision reflects the views of the head of the
agency.28
B. Legislative Power Cases
Article I vests the legislative power in Congress. The Court sometimes limits the power of
agencies by interpreting and enforcing the vesting clause in article I. For over a century, the Court
has interpreted the vesting clause of article I to limit the power of Congress to delegate some
decision-making power to agencies and to limit the power of agencies to make decisions.29 Those
opinions announced the non-delegation doctrine. Except for two opinions that the Court issued in
1935, however, the references to the non-delegation doctrine were dicta in opinions that upheld
broad congressional delegations of power to agencies.30 In two 1935 opinions, the Court held that
two provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act were unconstitutional because they
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violated the non-delegation doctrine.31
Since 1935, the Court has upheld scores of statutes that delegate extraordinarily broad
power to agencies. Decision making standards like “just,” “reasonable” and “public interest”
dominate the U.S. Code. Thus, for instance, “just” appears 2457 times, “reasonable” appears 9189
times, and “public interest” appears 2715 times.
In 2019, three Justices urged the Court to begin to enforce the non-delegation doctrine more
aggressively.32 Two other Justices have stated that they are also receptive to such a movement.33
The Court has not applied the non-delegation doctrine to any statute since 1935, but it began to
apply a closely related doctrine, the major questions doctrine, in 2000,34 and it greatly strengthened
that doctrine during its 2021-2022 Term.
In its 2021 opinion in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. OSHA35 (NFIB)
and its 2022 opinion in West Virginia v. EPA,36 the Court applied the major questions doctrine as
the basis to hold unlawful agency actions that were within the scope of the broad authority that
Congress had conferred on the agencies in statutes that were enacted over fifty years ago. The
Court held that the agency actions were unlawful because the agencies took unprecedented actions
that had significant economic and political effects based on power that Congress delegated to the
agencies in old broadly worded statutes. The Court concluded that the agencies could take actions
of that type only if Congress had clearly authorized the actions. In concurring opinions, several
Justices noted the close relationship between the major question doctrine and the non-delegation
doctrine.37
C. Appointments Clause Cases
The Court sometimes holds agency actions unlawful because they were taken by
unconstitutionally appointed officials.38 The appointments clause in article II separates officers of
the United States into two categories—inferior officers and what are often referred to as principal
officers. Congress can authorize the appointment of inferior officers in any of three ways—by the
president, by the head of an agency or by a court of law. The Court has interpreted the term
“inferior officer” to include anyone who exercises any significant power on behalf of the United
States, including bringing an enforcement action in a court, issuing a rule, or adjudicating a
regulatory dispute.39
To be an inferior officer, the officer must be inferior to one or more principal officers. The
Court has never announced exclusive criteria that describe the required relationship in detail, but
it is has held that an officer can be an inferior officer if the officer’s decisions are reviewable by a
principal officer, the officer can be removed by a principal officer, and the officer is subject to
31
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supervision in other ways by a principal officer.40 A principal officer can only be appointed through
the process of nomination by the president and confirmation by the Senate.
D. Executive Power Cases
The Court sometimes holds agency actions unlawful because they were taken by officials
who are not subject to the power of the president or a principal officer to remove the officer at will.
Article II vests the executive power in the president and provides that the president shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. The Court has interpreted those clauses to limit the power of
Congress to limit the power of the president to remove an officer by conditioning that power on a
finding of cause to remove the officer.
The Court has upheld statutory limits on the power to remove members of a multi-member
agency that performs quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions,41 but it has held that Congress
cannot limit the president’s power to remove any single agency head42 or to provide two layers of
for cause removal by both limiting the president’s power to remove a member of a multi-member
agency and limiting the power of the agency to remove an inferior officer.43

II. Cases that Illustrate the Choice of Remedy Problem
Four cases illustrate some of the problems that the Court is experiencing in its efforts to
identify appropriate remedies for these four types of constitutional flaws.
A. Problems with Remedies for Violations of the Prohibition on Delegating Legislative
Power
The first set of problems is illustrated by the Court’s 2021 opinion in NFIB v. OSHA.44 The
majority did not believe that the broadly worded statute that the Occupational Safety & Health
Administration (OSHA) relied on was adequate to support the mandate that all employers either
require their employees to be vaccinated against covid or to be tested regularly for covid, even
though the statutory language was broad enough to support that action.45 The majority could not
implement the traditional remedy for a violation of the vesting clause in article I. As a practical
matter, the Court could not hold the statute unconstitutional because it violates the non-delegation
doctrine.
The statute that the agency relied on was over fifty years old, and the Court had held that
it complied with the non-delegation doctrine over forty years earlier.46 As a practical matter, the
Court could not overrule a precedent and hold that a fifty-year-old statute that agencies and courts
had applied in thousands of cases was unconstitutional when it was enacted. Moreover, none of
the three new standards that the Justices have proposed to replace the permissive “intelligible
principle” standard are at all promising, as Kristin Hickman and I have explained in some detail.47
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The majority invoked the closely related major questions doctrine instead.
The majority invoked the major questions doctrine again in its 2022 opinion in West
Virginia v. EPA.48 The Court held that EPA could not take an action that was by far the most
promising action to mitigate climate change that the government has attempted to date—requiring
owners of coal-fired generating plants to switch to low carbon or carbon free sources. The majority
implicitly acknowledged that the broadly worded fifty-year-old statute that the agency relied on
authorized the agency to take the action. The Court rejected the validity of the action because it
was an unprecedented action that had significant political and economic effects and it was taken
under an old broadly worded statute that did not clearly authorize the agency to take the action.49
This problem plagues any attempt by the Court to limit the range of actions that agencies
can take by adopting aggressive interpretations of the vesting clause in article I. There are hundreds
of statutes that are worded more broadly than the statutes that the agencies relied on in the vaccine
mandate and climate change cases. Most of those statutes were enacted between thirty and eighty
years ago. Courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied those statutes in tens of thousands
of cases. The Court would look foolish if it issued hundreds of opinions in which it held
unconstitutional a high proportion of the statutes that Congress has enacted and that the Court has
applied for nearly a century.
The Court attempted to avoid this problem by adopting an aggressive version of the major
questions doctrine. That doctrine empowers the Court to invalidate an agency action if it is
unprecedented; it has significant economic or political effects; and it is supported only by an old
broadly worded statute.
This new remedy raises another serious problem, however. The Court justifies it as a means
of ensuring that Congress does its job of addressing any major new problem that confronts the
nation by enacting a statute that specifies with particularity the actions that the executive branch
can take to address the problem.50 In today’s extremely polarized political conditions, it is
unrealistic to expect Congress to act in that manner, however. The inability of Congress to enact
or amend regulatory statutes is well-documented.51 As I have explained at length, legislative
impotence will continue unless and until we replace party-based primaries with open primaries.52
It is easy to predict the unfortunate results of the Court’s use of the major questions doctrine
to enforce the vesting clause in Article I. The nation will confront a variety of serious new problems
like the covid pandemic and climate change in the future. When the executive branch attempts to
respond to those problems by acting based on old, broadly worded statutes, the Court will hold
those actions invalid through application of the major questions doctrine. The polarized and
paralyzed Congress will be unable to address the problems by enacting legislation that authorizes
the executive to act with the particularity that the Court demands. As a result, the major new
problems will not be addressed at all.
B. Problems with Remedies for Violations of the Executive Power
48
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The second set of problems is illustrated by the Court’s 2021 opinion in Collins v. Yellen.53
The Court held that the statutory for cause limit on the President’s power to remove the head of
the Federal Housing Finance Agency violates the vesting and take care clauses in article II.54 The
Court then remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to decide whether to provide
the petitioner a remedy for this violation of the constitution.55
The Court’s instructions to the lower court allow it to provide a remedy only in the highly
unlikely event that the court concludes that the president would have removed the agency head for
taking an action that injured the petitioner if he had known that he had the power to remove the
agency head without stating a cause for removal at the time the agency took the action.56 Justice
Gorsuch identified an obvious problem with this approach to the remedy issue.57 No one has any
incentive to challenge the constitutionality of a characteristic of an agency’s structure if they know
that they are not likely to obtain any remedy if they prevail.
C. Conflicts Between the Executive Power and Due Process
The third set of problems is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Axon Enterprise v.
FTC.58 They are a function of the inherent conflict between the Court’s attempts to implement the
due process clause by assuring that agencies are structured in a way that provides a neutral decision
maker in agency adjudications and the Court’s attempts to enforce the take care clause and the
vesting clause of article II. An ALJ concluded that the petitioner had violated the FTC Act, and
the FTC upheld that conclusion. The petitioner argued that the FTC has a fatal constitutional flaw
because Congress limited the agency’s power to remove an ALJ by requiring the agency to state a
cause for removal.
The petitioner in Axon relied on the Supreme Court’s 2010 opinion in which it held that it
is unconstitutional for Congress to provide two or more layers of insulation between the president
and an inferior officer by limiting the power of the president to remove an agency head to situations
in which the president states a cause for removal and limiting the power of the agency to remove
the inferior officer to situations in which the agency states a cause for removal.59 The for cause
limit on the power of the FTC to remove an ALJ violates that prohibition on two or more layers of
insulation of an inferior officer from the president’s removal power. The Supreme Court held that
ALJs are inferior officers in 2018.60 There are three layers of insulation between the president and
an ALJ at FTC. The President can only remove a member of the FTC for cause61, the FTC can
only remove an ALJ for cause62, and the President can only remove a member of the Merit System
Protection Board (MSPB) for cause.63 The MSPB has the exclusive power to determine whether
an agency has cause to remove an ALJ.64
53
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The remedy for this constitutional flaw is obvious. The Court should hold that the provision
of the APA that limits an agency’s power to remove an ALJ is invalid because it is unconstitutional.
The problem with that remedy is equally obvious. Congress limited the power of agency heads to
remove ALJs to assure parties to agency adjudications that their cases would be heard by neutral
decision makers rather than by decision makers who are biased in favor of the agency. If the Court
holds that the statutory for cause limit on an agency’s power to remove an ALJ is unconstitutional,
we are likely to return to the conditions of the 1930s in which ALJs exhibited systemic bias in
favor of agencies, thereby compromising the neutral decision maker requirement of due process.
There are many cases like Axon that are making their way to the Supreme Court.
Eventually, the Court will have to decide whether to enforce the vesting clause and the take care
clause of article II by holding that the statutory limit on an agency’s power to remove an ALJ is
unconstitutional. If the Court takes that action, it will have sacrificed the due process value that is
the basis for the limit.
Of course, even if the Supreme Court holds that the statutory limit on the power of an
agency to remove an ALJ is unconstitutional and it chooses the obvious remedy of holding that
provision of the APA invalid, it will encounter the additional remedial problem that became
apparent in Collins v. Yellin.65 The petitioner will obtain no remedy for the violation of its rights
because it is impossible for the petitioner to prove that the FTC that upheld the ALJ’s decision
would have removed the ALJ for making that decision if the FTC had known that it had the power
to remove the ALJ without cause at the time that the ALJ made the decision.
D. Problems with Remedies for Violations of the Appointments Clause
The fourth case that illustrates the problems that the Court is experiencing in choosing
remedies for constitutional flaws in agencies is the Supreme Court’s 2021 opinion in United States
v. Arthrex.66 The Patent and Trademark Appeals Board (PTAB) employs several hundred
Administrative Patent Judges (APJs).67 The America Invents Acts confers on each APJ the power
to decide that a patent is invalid.68 The APJs are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce.69 The
statute does not provide any opportunity for review of a decision of an APJ by the Secretary or by
the Director of PTAB. It also limits the agency’s power to remove an APJ by requiring the
Secretary of Commerce to state a cause for removing an APJ.70
The Federal Circuit concluded that APJs are principal officers, rather than inferior officers,
because they have the power to make final decisions and they can only be removed for cause.71
Since APJs are not appointed through the process of nomination by the president and confirmation
by the Senate, they are unconstitutional.
The most obvious remedy for that violation of the appointments clause would be to hold
invalid the provision of the statute that authorizes the Secretary to appoint APJs. That remedy
would be impossible to implement, however. It would require the President to nominate and the
Senate to confirm each of the hundreds of APJs. As Anne Joseph O’Connell has documented, the
65
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extreme political polarization that afflicts the nation has made it impossible for the President and
Congress to use that process to appoint the 1242 officers that now must be appointed in that
manner.72 They obviously could not appoint hundreds of additional officers through use of that
process.
The Federal Circuit adopted the remedy of deleting the statutory provision that limits the
power of the Secretary to remove APJs, thereby giving the Secretary of Commerce the power to
remove an APJ at will.73 In the view of the Federal Circuit, that would convert the APJs from
principal officers to inferior officers, thereby legitimating their appointment by the Secretary of
Commerce.74
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that the APJs are principal officers who
can only be appointed through the process of nomination and confirmation.75 It did not even
mention the obvious remedy of holding invalid the statutory provision that authorizes the Secretary
to appoint APJs. That remedy would be impossible to implement.
The petitioner argued that the appropriate remedy would be to invalidate the entire statute.
The Court rejected that remedy because it would interfere with the obvious desire of Congress to
encourage investment in new technology by making it easier to challenge the validity of the patents
that often discourage investment in new technology.76
The Court also rejected the remedy that the Federal Circuit chose. It did not state reasons
for that decision, but it is fair to infer that it disliked the adverse effects of the remedy on the due
process values that are furthered by limiting an agency’s power to remove an adjudicative officer
and it considered the Federal Circuit’s choice of remedies insufficient to cure the constitutional
flaw in the statute.
The Supreme Court chose the unprecedented remedy of adding a provision to the statute
that authorizes the Director of PTAB to review the decisions of APJs.77 Notably, the Court did not
choose the remedy that it chose in similar circumstances in its 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo.78
In that opinion, the Court recognized that it lacked the power to add a provision to a statute. It gave
Congress a period of thirty days in which to choose and implement a remedy for the structural flaw
that the Court detected through the process of amending the statute.79 Congress then saved the
statute by amending it in ways that eliminated the flaws that the Court detected.
The Arthrex Court gave no reason for its unprecedented decision to exercise legislative
power that is clearly vested in Congress. It is fair to draw the inference that the Court was aware
of the new phenomenon of legislative impotence and did not want to create a situation in which
the entire statute became invalid due to congressional inaction.
I can confirm the accuracy of the Court’s belief that Congress was incapable of amending
the America Invents Act in any way that would remedy the constitutional flaw that the Court
72
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detected. I was one of the many administrative law and constitutional law scholars who went to
capitol hill after the Federal Circuit decision in an effort to persuade Congress to amend the statute
in ways that would remedy the constitutional flaw that the Court detected. We described many
ways in which Congress could accomplish that relatively simple task. We then observed what has
become the norm. Congress was unable to reach agreement with respect to any of the minor
amendments to the statute that would render it constitutional.
Increasing political polarity has had massive adverse effects on Congress between 1976
and 2022.80 It was realistic for the Court to assume that Congress could agree on a cure for the
constitutional flaw that the Court detected in the statute that was at issue in 1976 in Buckley v.
Valeo. At that time, Congress regularly engaged in the bipartisan negotiations and compromises
that are essential to the process of enacting or amending a statute.
It was also realistic to assume that Congress could not agree on a cure for the constitutional
flaw in the statute that was at issue in 2022 in Arthrex. The unprecedented remedy that the Court
chose in Arthrex is an understandable reaction to the phenomenon of legislative impotence. The
Court assumed that Congress could not cure the constitutional flaw in the statute, so the Court
performed that legislative task for Congress.
It is notable, however, that the Court has chosen an inconsistent reaction to legislative
impotence in its major questions cases. In the context of an unexpected major problem like the
covid pandemic or climate change, the Court indulges the unsupportable assumption that Congress
can respond to the problem by enacting a statute that clearly authorizes an agency to respond to
the problem effectively and with particularity. Since legislative impotence makes that assumed
response to the problem unrealistic, the country is left with no institution that can address an
unprecedented new problem effectively even when an agency has the authority to address the
problem effectively by acting under an old broadly worded statute.
The many problems with the remedy that the Court chose in Arthrex became far more
apparent when the agency and the Federal Circuit attempted to implement the remedy.81 The
position of Director of PTAB was vacant, as was the position of Deputy Director, the only other
principal officer in PTAB.82
The decision on remand was made by the Commissioner. The Commissioner is not a
principal officer. He is an inferior officer.83 Moreover, he was not even Acting Director or Acting
Deputy Director.84 Under the Vacancies Act, only someone who has been nominated by the
president and confirmed by the Senate for some other position can be appointed unilaterally to fill
a vacancy as an “acting” officer.85 The Commissioner was not even eligible to be Acting Director
or Acting Deputy Director.
The Commissioner denied Arthrex’s petition for reconsideration of the decision of the APJ
based solely on an internal agency rule that had been issued when the agency had a Director.86
That rule provided that the duties of the Director and the Deputy Director are delegated to the
80

See source cited in note 50 supra.
See Arthrex v. Nephew & Son, 35 F. 4th 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
82
Id. at 1332-33.
83
Id. at 1332-33.
84
Id. at 1336-38.
85
Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§3345 et seq.
86
35 F. 4th at 1333.
81

Commissioner when both the office of Director and the office of Deputy Director are vacant.
The Federal Circuit held that the Commissioner had the power to review the decision of
the APJ based on an 1898 precedent in which the Supreme Court held that an inferior officer can
perform the duties of an officer on a temporary basis under authority previously delegated by the
principal officer.87 The court held that the Commissioner was only temporarily performing the
duties of the Director and the Deputy Director even though those offices had been vacant for almost
a year and there was no limit on the period in which the Commissioner would be required to
perform those duties.88
The court held that the fact that the Commissioner was not appointed as Acting Director or
Deputy Director under the Vacancies Act was irrelevant because that statute has no application to
people who are performing the duties of an officer under delegated authority.89 The court
recognized that its holding created a situation in which the Vacancies Act has “vanishingly small”
scope.90 The court pointed out that a contrary holding would have disastrous “real world” effects,
however, including calling into question the validity of 668,000 patents.91
Thus, the unprecedented remedy that the Supreme Court chose for an arguable violation of
the appointments clause in Arthrex was not only inconsistent with the remedies that the Court
chose for a violation of the appointments clause in Buckley v. Valeo and for the arguable violations
of the vesting clause in article I in NFIB and West Virginia. It was also an exercise in futility.
The result of the Courts’ decision to confer the power to review an inferior officers’
decision on a principal officer was to give that constitutionally required power to another inferior
officer. It is hard to understand how allowing another inferior officer to review the decision of an
inferior officer cures the arguable constitutional defect in the statute.
The remedy that the Court chose in Arthrex makes no sense, but it is likely to be the only
remedy that is available in most of the cases in which the Court holds that an inferior officer’s
decisions must be reviewable by a principal officer. As Anne Joseph O’Connell has documented,92
it has become so difficult to appoint a principal officer through the process of nomination by the
president and confirmation by the Senate that a large and rapidly increasing proportion of principal
officer positions are occupied by inferior officers who are performing the functions of a principal
officer under a delegation of power from a prior Senate-confirmed principal officer who is no
longer in office. Many principal officer positions remain vacant for years.

III.

The Choice of Remedy Problem Will Become Worse

If the Court continues on its present course, it will encounter problems in choosing a
remedy for constitutional flaws that are worse than the problems that it has experienced to date.
Two disputes that are on the way to the Supreme Court illustrate the magnitude and severity
of the problems that the Court will confront if it continues to apply the approach to
interpretation of the constitution that it has adopted in recent years.
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A. The Social Security Administration Problem
The Social Security Administration employs 1500 ALJs who preside in hundreds of
thousands of contested disability hearings every year.93 There are at least two types of disputes
about the constitutionality of the Social Security Administration’s disability decision making
process that are making their way to the Supreme Court. First, some unsuccessful applicants for
disability benefits argue that the SSA ALJs are unconstitutional because they can only be removed
for cause. Second, some unsuccessful applicants argue that the SSA ALJs were unconstitutionally
appointed.
The first dispute raises the combination of remedial problems that are discussed in sections IIA
and C. The second dispute raises the remedial problems that are discussed in section IID, but it
raises those problems in a context in which the adverse effects of any choice of remedies are far
worse. It also raises an additional serious remedial problem.
SSA ALJs are like APJs. They can only be removed for cause, and their decisions to grant or
deny benefits are not reviewable by a principal officer. They are reviewable only by the Social
Security Appeals Council.94 The Council is comprised of SSA employees who might be inferior
officers. They cannot be principal officers because they are not nominated by the president and
confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioner is a principal officer who is appointed through the
process of nomination by the president followed by confirmation by the Senate, but the
Commissioner does not have the power to review the decisions of ALJs. SSA ALJs are appointed
by the Commissioner.
If the Court uses the reasoning it used in Arthrex to characterize SSA ALJs, it will hold that
they are principal officers who were appointed through use of a process that is unconstitutional. It
will then have to choose a remedy for that constitutional flaw. The most obvious option is simply
to hold that the appointments process is unconstitutional and to force SSA, the president, and
Congress to remedy the flaw by using the process of nomination by the president followed by
confirmation by the Senate to appoint SSA ALJs. That remedy is impossible to implement,
however. Political polarity has created conditions in which the president and Congress are unable
to use that process to appoint the existing 1242 principal officers. It is absurd to expect them to be
able to use that process to appoint 1500 SSA ALJs.
The second option is to follow the precedent that the Court established in Buckley v. Valeo.95
The Court could give the president and Congress a few months to remedy the constitutional flaw
by adding a provision to the statute that authorizes the Commissioner to review the decisions of
SSA ALJs. There is a significant risk that the legislative impotence created by political polarity
would render it impossible for the president and Congress to agree on a statutory amendment that
would cure the constitutional flaw, however. That would leave the SSA with no means through
which it could decide the hundreds of thousands of contested disability disputes that come before
it each year.
The third option is to follow the precedent that the Court established in Arthrex. The Court
could eliminate the role of the legislative branch and take the inherently legislative action of
amending the statute by adding a provision that authorizes the Commissioner to review the
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decisions of SSA ALJs. That choice of remedies would be likely to produce the same bizarre result
as it has in Arthrex, however. If the position of Commissioner is vacant, the review function might
have to be performed by an inferior officer to whom the last confirmed Commissioner delegated
his duties.
Even if there is a Senate confirmed Commissioner in office, that choice of remedies would
create another problem. The heads of regulatory agencies regularly review the modest number of
initial decisions that their ALJs make, but it is absurdly unrealistic to expect the Social Security
Commissioner to review the hundreds of thousands of decisions that SSA ALJs make each year.
He would have to delegate most of that function to SSA employees who are not even inferior
officers. Thus, a Supreme Court opinion in which the Court exercises the legislative power that
the constitution confers on Congress by adding a statutory provision that authorizes the
Commissioner to review ALJ decisions would be a transparently ineffective remedy.
B. The Jarkesy Problems
The second dispute is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Jarkesy v. SEC.96 The court
held that the SEC’s use of an ALJ to preside in a securities fraud case was unconstitutional for
three reasons. First, it held that the statute that allowed the SEC to choose between bringing a fraud
case in federal court or assigning it to an ALJ violates the non-delegation doctrine.97 Second, it
held that SEC ALJs are unconstitutional because they are not subject to at will removal by the
SEC.98 Third, it held that the SEC decision to assign an ALJ to preside deprived the defendant of
its Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.99
The first holding creates the remedial problems described in section IID. The second holding
creates the remedial problems described in section IIC. The third holding creates a new cluster of
remedial problems.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress can authorize agencies to decide civil penalty cases
without violating the Seventh Amendment if either of two conditions are met.100 First, the Seventh
Amendment only applies to claims that could be resolved under the common law in 1789. It does
not apply to claims that are “analogous” to claims that could be resolved under the common law
in 1789.101 Second, even if a class of claims could have been resolved at common law in 1789,
Congress can reallocate the resolution of that class of claims to an agency if it concludes that they
involve the resolution of public rights disputes. The Court has defined public rights disputes to
include “cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory
objective within the agency’s authority.”102
The Fifth Circuit held that the securities fraud claim that the SEC ALJ adjudicated was not
within the scope of the public rights justification for congressional reallocation of the power to
resolve a claim that could have been resolved at common law. It also changed the test that the
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Supreme Court had used to determine whether a claim was within the scope of the Seventh
Amendment in an important respect. The Fifth Circuit implicitly recognized the reality that the
securities fraud claims that Congress authorized the SEC to resolve are not the same as any claim
that could have been resolved at common law in 1789. It held that the Seventh Amendment right
to jury trial applies to the securities fraud claims that Congress authorized the SEC to resolve
because they are “akin to” fraud claims that could have been resolved at common law in 1789.103
If the Supreme Court agrees with that holding, it will encounter massive problems in its
attempts to choose an appropriate remedy for that arguable constitutional flaw. A high proportion
of the claims that agencies regulatory agencies resolve today are “akin to” claims that could have
been resolved at common law in 1789.
We can start with the thousands of claims that agencies are authorized to resolve through
application of the ubiquitous “just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory” standard. Congress
first instructed a federal agency to apply that standard in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.
Congress has since included it as a decisional standard in hundreds of other statutes.
The standard had a rich history before Congress adopted it in 1887. As the Supreme Court
recognized in 1884, many states adopted the standard in constitutions and statutes during the
1800s.104 As the Ohio Supreme Court recognized in 1885, the states borrowed the standard from
the common law that U.S., colonial, and British courts had applied for centuries.105
If the Court upholds the Fifth Circuit’s Seventh Amendment holding in Jarkesy, it will have to
devise some means through which federal courts can accommodate a massive increase in the
number of cases in which they provide jury trials. That is an impossible task.

IV.

Ways in Which the Court Can Manage the Remedy Problems

If the Court continues its effort to detect and cure every constitutional defect in the structure
and distribution of powers in government with the same approach to interpretation of the
constitution that it is has been using, it will continue to encounter intractable problems in its choice
of remedies. In many contexts, it will have to choose among (1) remedies that are totally
ineffective, e.g., replacing review by one inferior officer with review by another inferior officer;
(2) remedies that create constitutional flaws that are worse than the flaw that is being remedied,
e.g., sacrificing due process values by making ALJs removable at will by agencies; or (3) remedies
that make it impossible for government to function, e.g., requiring the president and the senate to
nominate and confirm 1500 more principal officers or requiring federal district judges to preside
in thousands of additional jury trials.
The Court can continue to pursue its goal of improving the fit between the constitution and
the structure of government and the allocation of power within government without creating
intractable choice of remedy problems if it takes a less rigid approach that confers an appropriate
degree of deference on Congress. By this point in its search for a government structure that is
consistent with its rigid interpretation of the constitution, the Court should be able to recognize
that Congress has an extraordinarily difficult task. It must create a structure of government and a
distribution of powers that simultaneously furthers the values that are reflected in the constitution
and allows the government to function in a reasonably efficient and effective manner. The Court
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should take an approach to its restructuring program that is more respectful of the challenges that
Congress confronts and more deferential to the ways in which Congress has grappled with those
challenges.
I will describe five illustrations of modest changes in approach that the Court can take that
will allow it to continue to improve the fit between the constitution and the structure and allocation
of power of government without creating unacceptable problems in its choice of remedies. They
are: to reject the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Jarkesy, change the definition of inferior officer to
exclude ALJs that make benefit decisions, change the definition of inferior officer by accepting as
adequate a wide range of supervisory relationships between principal officers and inferior officers,
uphold the decision of Congress to provide ALJs with protection from agencies that want to induce
ALJs to make decisions that are biased in favor of the agency, and change the major questions
doctrine in a way that allows the government to respond to an unprecedented major problem by
taking an unprecedented major action if the action is within the broad statutory authority of the
agency.
A. The Court Should Reject the Fifth Circuit’s Holding in Jarkesy
The Supreme Court should start by rejecting the effort by the Fifth Circuit to preclude
agencies from adjudicating a wide range of regulatory disputes based on an interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment that the Court has repeatedly rejected. If the Court overrules its precedents
and holds that the Seventh Amendment applies to all claims that are “akin to” claims that could
have been adjudicated at common law in 1789, it will quickly discover that it has created a caseload
for the federal courts that is well beyond their capacity to manage.
B. The Court Should Hold that ALJs Who Make Benefit Decisions Are Not Inferior
Officers
In its 2018 decision in Lucia v. SEC,106 the Supreme Court held that ALJs at the SEC are
inferior officers rather than employees. That holding clearly applies to other ALJs who adjudicate
disputes at regulatory agencies. It does not necessarily apply to the 1500 ALJs who adjudicate
disability disputes at the SSA or to the hundreds of other administrative judges who adjudicate
benefit disputes at other agencies, however.
It would be easy for the Court to distinguish SSA ALJs from SEC ALJs and to hold that
SSA ALJs are employees. The tasks performed by the two groups of judges differ in many ways.
The Court has often distinguished between benefit decisions and regulatory decisions.107 It has
also distinguished between the adversarial proceedings that agencies use to adjudicate regulatory
disputes and the inquisitorial proceedings that agencies use to resolve benefit disputes.108 Holding
that administrative judges who make benefit decisions are employees would greatly reduce the
remedial problems that the Court must confront. The constitution allows Congress near complete
discretion with respect to the status and rights of employees and the permissible relationships
between employees, agencies, and the president.
C. The Court Should Hold that Inferior Officers Need Only Be Supervised by Principal
Officers
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The Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to the relationship between an officer and a
principal officer that makes an officer an inferior officer refer to three criteria—the power to
remove the officer, the power to review the decisions made by the officer, and other ways in which
the principal officer supervises the officer.109 The Court has never held that the principal officer
must have the power to remove the officer without cause, and it has never held that the principal
officer must have all three of those powers over an officer to qualify the officer as an inferior
officer.
The Court could significantly reduce the number of officers who are principal officers, and
thus must be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, by clarifying the nature of
the relationship between a principal officer and an officer that makes the officer an inferior officer.
The Court should hold that there must be an adequate supervisory relationship between a principal
officer and an officer, but the power to remove the officer with or without stating a cause for
removal and the power to review the officer’s decisions are only forms of evidence that a court
can consider in deciding whether the supervisory relationship is adequate to support a conclusion
that the officer is an inferior officer. A court should be empowered to decide that a principal officer
has adequate means of supervising on officer to make the officer an inferior officer even if the
principal officer does not have the power to remove the officer or to review the officer’s decisions
in adjudications.
D. The Court Should Uphold the For Cause Limit on the Power to Remove ALJs
Congress limited the power of an agency to remove an ALJ to reduce the risk that agencies
would use the threat of removal as a means of inducing the ALJ to make decisions that are biased
in favor of the agency. Congress acted based on solid evidence that ALJs are likely to act in a
manner that reflects pro-agency bias in the absence of such a safeguard on their decisional
independence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the congressional decision to
limit the power of agencies to remove ALJs furthers the values on which the due process clause is
based.
Congress was aware of the need to ensure that the president could exercise the powers
vested in him by article II and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It coupled the
provisions of the APA that are intended to insure that ALJs act as neutral decision makers with a
provision that authorizes the agency that is headed by a presidential appointee to replace the ALJ’s
initial decision with its own decision. The Court should respect the decision that Congress made
in its effort to further due process values while simultaneously assuring that the president can
exercise the powers vested in him and take care that the law be faithfully exercised
E. The Court Should Not Apply the Major Questions Doctrine to Unprecedented Major
Problems
The Court has said that the major questions doctrine applies to unprecedented major
exercises of power that are supported only by old broadly worded statutes. The case in which the
Court originally announced and applied the doctrine involved an unprecedented attempt to rely on
a broadly worded statute that was nearly a century old, the Food & Drug Act of 1906, to regulate
a dangerous substance, cigarettes, that had been in use for over a century. Thus, it was an
unprecedented attempt to use an old broadly worded statute to address a hazard that had been well
known for decades.
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The contexts in which the Court applied the doctrine in its 2021-22 Term differed
significantly from the context of the case that gave rise to the doctrine. The Court applied the
doctrine to unprecedented major actions that agencies took to address unprecedented major new
problems—the covid pandemic and climate change. The major questions doctrine can produce a
great deal of harm when it is applied in that context. When it is coupled with the legislative
impotence that the Court implicitly recognized with its choice of remedies in Arthrex, it can leave
the nation powerless to address an unprecedented major new problem. The Court can avoid that
problem by restoring the major questions doctrine to its original context and holding that an agency
can take a major unprecedented action under an old broadly worded statute if it confronts an
unprecedented major new problem.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s efforts to restructure government and to reallocate power among
units of government in ways that conform to its interpretation of the Constitution is forcing it to
choose between remedies for constitutional flaws that are ineffective and remedies that make it
impossible to govern the country. The Court can avoid that problem by using less rigid methods
of detecting constitutional flaws that are more respectful of the difficulty of the task that the
legislature must undertake in its efforts to create a government that will work.

